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Virginia Roberts Responds To Maxwell's Summary Judgement Request (Part 4)

Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.

Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.


to contact me:


bobbycapucci@protonmail.com


source:


Giuffre-unseal.pdf (courthousenews.com)

Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.

In this episode, we're going to continue looking at Virginia

Roberts' response to Ghislaine Maxwell's motion for a summary judgment.

Number 7. The Black Book Palm Beach police confiscated an

extensive list of contacts with their phone numbers from defendant

and Epstein's residence. Ghislaine Maxwell maintained a contact list In

an approximately 100-page long hard copy, which was openly available

to other house employees, it consisted primarily of telephone numbers, addresses,

or email addresses for various personal friends, associates, employees, or

personal or business connections of Epstein or the defendant. Prior

to being terminated by defendant, The Palm Beach House butler

Alfredo Rodriguez printed a copy of this document and ultimately

provided it to the FBI. This document reflects the numerous

phone numbers of defendant Epstein as well as staff phone numbers. Additionally,

and importantly, there are several sections entitled Massage alongside a

geographical designation with names of females and corresponding telephone numbers.

These numbers included those of underage females with no training

in massage therapy, including redacted, redacted and redacted, identified during

the criminal investigation of Epstein. This document is an authentic

reflection of the people who were associated with Epstein, defendant

and the management of their properties, and the knowledge each

had of the contents of the document. 8. Sex Slave Amazon.com

Book Receipt Detective Ricari authenticated an Amazon.com receipt that the

Palm Beach police collected from Jeffrey Epstein's trash. The books

he ordered are titled 1. SM-101, A Realistic Introduction by

Jay Wiseman. 2. Slavecraft, Roadmaps for Erotic Servitude, Principles, Skills,

and Tools by Guy Baldwin. 3. Training with Miss Abernathy.

a workbook for erotic slaves and their owners by Christian Abernathy,

as shown below. This disturbing 2005 purchase corroborates Ms. Roberts'

account of being sexually abused and exploited by defendant Ann Epstein.

Not to mention the dozens of underage girls in the

Palm Beach police report. Additionally, defendant testified that she was

not with Jeffrey Epstein in 2005 and 2006, when he

was ordering books on how to use sex slaves. However,

record evidence contradicts that testimony. Number 9. Thailand Folder with

Defendant's Phone Number Defendant also was integral in arranging to

have Virginia go to Thailand. While Epstein had paid for

a massage therapy session in Thailand, there was a catch.

Defendant told Virginia she had to meet young girls in

Thailand and bring her back to the U.S. for Epstein

and Defendant. Indeed, on the travel records and tickets defendant

gave to Virginia, defendant wrote on the back the name

of the girl Virginia was supposed to meet, and she

was also instructed to check in frequently with defendant as

it was further signified by the words, Call Ms. Maxwell.

917 redacted on Virginia's travel documents. In this case, Virginia

also produced the hard copy records from her hotel stay

in Thailand paid for by Epstein. See McCauley's declaration at

Exhibit 1. 10. It is undisputed fact that the FBI

report and the Churcher emails reference Ms. Roberts' accounts of

sexual activity with Prince Andrew that she made in 2011,

contrary to the defendant's argument that Ms. Roberts has never

made such claims until 2014. Based on the FBI's interview

of Ms. Roberts in 2011, They wrote a report reflecting Ms.

Roberts' claims concerning her sexual encounters with Prince Andrew. Additionally,

2011 correspondence with Sharon Churcher shows that Ms. Roberts disclosed

her sexual encounters with Prince Andrew, but Churcher had to

check with the publisher's lawyers on how much can be published.

From Sharon Churcher, Mail on Sunday, to Virginia Roberts. Hi there,

been up all night writing. Won't have an opinion from

our lawyer, on how much can be published until London

wakes up. The lawyers wanted internal FBI documents, but I

think the Justice Department letter is all you have from

the feds. Anyway, I can give you a call early afternoon,

maybe have a late lunch. See Macaulay Declaration at Exhibit 34,

Roberts 003678. Accordingly, there is documentary evidence that refutes defendant's

meritless argument that Ms. Roberts did not allege she had

sex with Prince Andrew in until 2014. To the contrary,

two sources, including the FBI, show Ms. Roberts made these

claims in 2011. C. Defendant has not produced no documents

whatsoever that tend to show that she did not procure

underage girls for Jeffrey Epstein. Defendant has produced no documents

that even tend to show that she did not procure

underage girls for sex with Epstein. And no documents that

tend to show that she did not participate in the abuse. Indeed,

defendant refused to produce any documents dated prior to 2009,

which includes the 2000 through 2002 period during which she

abused Ms. Roberts. Against this backdrop of an avalanche of

evidence showing the defendant sexually trafficked Ms. Roberts, summary judgment

on any of the issues advanced by defendant is inappropriate.

While we discuss the particulars Of the individual claim below,

the larger picture is important too. Ms. Roberts will prove

at trial that Epstein and defendant sexually trafficked her, and yet,

when Ms. Roberts had the courage to come forward and

expose what defendant had done to the world in a

court pleading, trying to hold Epstein accountable, defendant responded by

calling her a liar in a press release intended for

a worldwide publication. Such heinous conduct is not a mere opinion,

but rather, a defamation executed deliberately and with actual malice.

The jury should hear all of the evidence and then

render its verdict on Ms. Roberts' complaint. Part 3. Legal

Standard Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a motion for summary judgment may be granted

only when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that all moving parties is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law. The Second Circuit

has repeatedly held that all ambiguities and inferences to be

drawn from the underlying facts should be resolved in favor

of the party opposing the motion, and all doubts as

to the existence of a genuine issue for trial should

be resolved against the moving party. Sweet J. citing Brady,

Burst Town of Colchester, 863, F. 2D, 205, 210, 2nd Circuit, 1988.

In other words, in deciding a motion for summary judgment,

the court must construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences

in the non-moving party's favor. In Agent Orange, Product Liability, 5.17, F. 3D, 76, 87,

2nd Circuit, 2008. Stern v. Cosby, 645. F.SUPP, 2D, 258, 269, SDNY, 2009.

Summary judgment should be denied if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor

of the non-moving party. C. NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC, LLC, 537.

Defendant's lead argument is that when she issued a press

release attacking Ms. Roberts to members of the media, she

somehow was not responsible when the media quickly published her attacks.

If accepted, this remarkable claim would eviscerate defamation law, as

it would permit a defamer to send a defamatory statement

to the media and then stand back and watch, immune

from liability. When, as in this case, the defamatory statements

are published around the world. This absurd position is not

the law, particularly given that the defendant released a statement

to the media asking them to please find attached and

quotable statements on behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell. To make her

claim seem plausible, defendant cites older cases, some dating back

as far as 1906. This presents a distorted picture of

the case law on these issues. As a leading authority

on defamation explains with regard to liability for republication by

another of statement by defendant, two standards have evolved. The

older one is that the person making the defamatory statements

is liable for a republication only if it occurs with

his or her express or implied authorization of consent. The

more modern formulation adds responsibility for all republication that can

reasonably be anticipated or that is the natural and probable

consequence of the publication. SAC on defamation, section 2.7.2 at

2-113 and 2-114, 4th edition, 2016. In this case, however,

the nuances of the applicable legal standards make little difference

because defendants so clearly authorized, indeed desired, and did everything

possible to obtain publication of her defamatory statements attacking Ms. Roberts. 1.

Under New York law, defendant is liable for the media's

publication of her press release. Given the obvious purposes of

defamation law, New York law unsurprisingly assigns liability to individuals

for the media's publication of press releases. Indeed, New York

appellate courts have repeatedly held that an individual is liable

for media publishing that individual's defamatory press release. See Levy v. Smith, 18. NYS. 3D 438, 439, 132, A.D.3SD 961, 962,

and 963. NYAD 2nd Department 2015. Generally, one who makes

a defamatory statement is not responsible for for its re-communication

without his authority or request to another over whom he

has no control. Here, however, the appellant intended and authorized

the republication of the allegedly defamatory content of the press

releases in the news articles. National Puerto Rican Day Parade, Inc. v.

Casa Publications, Inc. 914 NYS. 2D 120-123 79 A.D. 3D 592

595 NYAD 1 Department 2010. Affirming the refusal to dismiss

defamation counts against a defendant who submitted an open letter

that was published in a newspaper and that the defendant

paid to have the open letter published and finding that

the defendant authorized the newspaper to re-communicate his statements. See

also Restatement 2nd of Tort's Section 576, 1977, the publication

of a libel or slander is a legal cause of

any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third

person if the repetition was authorized or intended by the

original defamer or the repetition was reasonably to be expected.

Defendant deliberately sent her defamatory statement to major news media

publishers for worldwide circulation because defendant wanted the public at

large to believe Ms. Roberts was lying about her abuse.

Defendant even hired a public relations media specialist to ensure

the media would publish her statement. Her effort succeeded. Her

public relations agent instructed dozens of media outlets to publish

her quotable defamatory statements and they did. Despite this deliberate

campaign to widely publicize her defamatory statement, defendant now claims

any responsibility for the media publishing her press release. If

we understand defendant's position correctly, because she somehow lacked control

over what major newspapers and other media finally put in

their stories, she escapes liability for defamation. This nonsensical position

would let a defamer send a false defamatory letter to

major media and then, when they publish the accusation, escape

any liability. Such an argument is not only an affront

to logic, but is contrary to prevailing New York case law,

cited above. Perhaps even more important, in the context of

the pending summary judgment motion, it would require a defendant

to convince the jury that she did not authorize or

intend for the major media to publish her press release. Obviously,

the disputed facts on this point are legion, and summary

judgment is accordingly inappropriate. Even the cases defendant cites contradict

her argument. She first cites Geraci v. Propst, in which

a defendant sent a letter to the Board of Fire Commissioners,

and years later, a newspaper published the letter. The court

held that the defendant was not liable for the belated publication,

made years later without his knowledge or participation. I.D. at 340.

By contrast, defendant not only authorized the defamatory statement, but

paid money to her publicist to convince media outlets to

publish it promptly, actions taken with both her knowledge and consent.

Defendant's statement was thus not published without her authority or request,

as in Jirachi, but by her express authority and by

her express request. Defendant's publicist Testimony and documents produced by

defendant's publicist unambiguously established that the media published her press

release with defendant's authority and by her request. Question. When

you sent that email, were you acting pursuant to Ms.

Maxwell's retention of your services? Answer. Yes, I was. Question.

The subject line does have FW, which to me indicates

it's a forward. Do you know where the rest of

this email chain is? Answer, my understanding of this is,

it was a holiday in the UK, but Mr. Barton

was not necessarily accessible at some point in time, so

this had to be sent to him, originally by Ms. Maxwell,

and because he was unavailable, she forwarded it to me

for immediate action. I therefore responded, okay, Ghislaine, I'll go

with this. It is my understanding that this is the

agreed statement, because the subject of the second one is urgent,

this is the statement. so I take that as an

instruction to send it out as a positive command. This

is the statement. Similarly, another case cited by defendant Davis v.

Costa-Gavris involved a libel claim against a book author who

wrote an account of the 1972 military coup in Chile.

Years later, the plaintiff attempted to ascribe defamation liability to

a third-party publishing house, decision to republish the book in

paperback form, and a third-party filmmaker who released a movie

based on the book. The court held that a party

who is innocent of all complicity in the publication of

a libel cannot be held accountable, but that a deliberate

decision to republish or active participation in implementing the republication

resurrects the liability. 580F. SUPP. 1082. 1094. SDNY 1984. Here, defendant made a

deliberate decision to publish her press release and actively participated

in that process. At the very least, the jury must

make a determination of whether the defendant was innocent of

all complicity for a libelous statement contained in her press release. Finally,

defendant cites Cara Duman v. Newsday, Inc., 416 N.E.2D 557, 1980,

which held that reporters of a series of articles on

narcotics trade cannot be held personally liable for injuries arising

from its subsequent republication in book form absent a showing

that they approved or participated in some other manner in

the activities of the third-party republisher. ID 416 N.E.2D at

559 and 560 Again, the injury could reasonably find that

defendant both approved of and even participated in the media's

publication of her press release. Indeed, it is hard to

understand how any jury could find anything else. Defendant was

obviously active in influencing the media to publish her defamatory

press release she both approved of and pushed for the

publication of the press release. Accordingly, she is liable for

its publication. Therefore, disclaiming responsibility for the media's publication of

a statement for which she hired a publicist for the

purpose of influencing the media to publish that statement is

contrary to both prevailing case law and the cases cited

by the defendant. All right, folks, we're going to wrap

up there. In the next episode, we'll pick up where

we left off with the defendant is liable for the

media's publication of the defamatory statement. All of the information

that goes with this episode can be found in the

description box.

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