Virginia Roberts Responds To Maxwell's Summary Judgement Request (Part 6)
Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.
Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
Giuffre-unseal.pdf (courthousenews.com)
Speaker 1: What's up everyone and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
We're going to pick up where we left off with
Virginia Roberts' response to Ghislaine Maxwell's attempt to get a
summary judgment. C. Defendant's defamatory statement was not opinion as
a matter of law. As this court previously held correctly,
defendant stating that Ms. Roberts' claims of sexual assault or
lies is not an expression of opinion. First, statements that
Roberts' claims against defendant are untrue, have been shown to
be untrue, and are obvious lies, have a specific and
readily understood factual meaning. That Roberts is not telling the
truth about her history of sexual abuse and the defendant's role,
and that some verifiable investigation has occurred and come to
a definitive conclusion proving the fact. Second, these statements, as
they themselves allege, are capable of being proven true or false,
and therefore constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in
their full context, while defendant's statements have the effect of
generally denying plaintiff's story, they also clearly constitute fact to
the reader. Roberts v. Maxwell 165 F.S.U.P.P. 3D 147 152
SDNY 2016 The court further explained, Plaintiff cannot be making
claims shown to be untrue, that are obvious lies without
being a liar. Furthermore, to suggest individual is not telling
the truth about her history of having been sexually assaulted
as a minor constitutes more than a general denial. It
alleges something deeply disturbing about the character of an individual
willing to be publicly dishonest about such reprehensible crimes. Defendant
statements clearly imply that the denials are based on facts,
separate and contradictory to those that plaintiff has alleged. Defendant
argues that somehow the context of the entire statement, tested
against the understanding of the average reader, should be the
press release as a whole being read only by journalists.
This is an unreasonable construct because the ultimate audience for
a press release is the public. Indeed, the purpose of
a press release is to reach readers. Unsurprisingly, defendant cites
no case that holds that journalists might somehow believe that
statements of fact are opinion while others do not. This
court has previously covered this ground when it clearly stated,
sexual assault of a minor is a clear-cut issue. Either
transgression occurred or it did not. Either a Maxwell was
involved or she was not. The issue is not a
matter of opinion or and there cannot be differing understandings
of the same facts that justify diametrically opposed opinion as
to whether defendant was involved in plaintiff's abuse as plaintiff
has claimed. Each plaintiff is telling the truth about her
story and defendant's involvement, or the defendant is telling the
truth and she was not involved in the trafficking and
ultimate abuse of the plaintiff. Roberts v. Maxwell, 165f. supp At
152 SDNY 2016, the same conclusion applies now. At the
motion to dismiss stage, defendant had not yet produced the
statement she issued to the press. The statement is now
in evidence, so there is no ambiguity as to what
defendant released to the press. The absurdity of defendant Characterizing
his statement calling Ms. Roberts a liar as mere opinion
is revealed by the fact that the defendant was the
one who was sexually trafficking and otherwise abusing Ms. Roberts.
No reasonable person in any context would construe that as
defendant's mere opinion on the subject since defendant knew she
was abusing Ms. Roberts, and indeed this argument is contradicted
by the defendant's own deposition testimony. Question, do you believe
that Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused minors? Answer, I can only
testify to what I know. I know that Virginia is
a liar, and I know what she testified is a lie.
So I can only testify to what I know to
be falsehoods, and half those falsehoods are enormous, and so
I can only categorically deny everything she has said. And
that is the only thing that I can talk about,
because I have no knowledge of anything else. C. McCauley Declaration,
at Exhibit 11, Maxwell Deposition, April 17, 2016. defendant slyly
contends in her motion that Mr. Barton's arguments in the
press release constitute pure opinion attempting to disclaim any involvement
in making the defamatory statement. However, it is not Mr.
Barton's statement nor his opinion that is at issue here.
At issue here is defendant's statement, a statement attributable to
her that she approved whose publication she commanded and for
which he hired a public relations representative to disseminate to
at least 30 journalists for publication. While Mr. Barton could
possibly have had his own opinion as to whether or
not his client abused Ms. Roberts, defendant cannot express an
opinion on a binary yes or no subject where she
knows the truth. As this court previously articulated, statements that
Roberts claims against defendant are untrue, have been shown to
be untrue, and are obvious lies, have a specific and
readily understood factual meaning. Roberts v. Maxwell, 165F. SUPP. 3D at 152. Again,
at the very least, the jury must pass on such issues. D.
The pre-litigation privilege does not apply to defendant's press release. 1.
Defendant fails to make a showing that the pre-litigation privilege applies.
Defendant's next argument seeks refuge in their pre-litigation privilege. If
we understand the argument correctly, defendant seems to be saying
that because she was contemplating an unspecified and never filed
lawsuit involving the British press, she somehow had a green
light to make whatever defamatory statement she wanted about Ms. Roberts.
To prove such a remarkably claim, defendant relies on case
law involving such mundane topics as cease and desist letters
sent to opposing parties and the like. Obviously, such arguments
have no application to the press release that defendants sent
out worldwide attacking Ms. Roberts' veracity. The problems with the
defendants' argument are legion. For starters, there is no record, evidence,
not even defendants' own testimony suggesting that she was contemplating
litigation against Ms. Roberts or that her press release was
related to contemplated litigation against Ms. Roberts. Tellingly, the only
evidence defendants cite of any alleged contemplated litigation is the self-serving,
post hoc partial waiver of attorney-client privilege found in the
Barton Declaration. As discussed above, the Declaration fails to establish
that there was good faith anticipated in litigation between her
and Ms. Roberts, particularly when evidence in the record contradicts
such assertions. At the very least, it is a matter
of fact for the jury to decide. In another case,
in which a defendant attempted to claim pre-litigation privilege applied
to statements made to the press, This court denied summary
judgment and held, to prevail on a qualified privilege defense,
defendant must show that his claim of privilege does not
raise triable issues of fact that would defeat it. Block v.
First Blood Associates, 691 F.S.U.P.P. 685, 699 and 700, Suite J,
SDNY 1988. Denying summary judgment on the pre-litigation qualification privilege
affirmative defense, because there was a genuine issue as to
malice and appropriate purpose. Defendant's claim here likewise fails. First,
defendant's testimony makes no mention of any contemplated lawsuit, much
less any contemplated lawsuit against Ms. Roberts. Second, defendant has
offered no witnesses who will testify that she intended to
bring any lawsuit. Third, she did not, in fact, bring
any such lawsuit. The only evidence is a post hoc
declaration written by her attorney. Finally, it must be remembered,
as explained at length above, the defendant had sexually trafficked
defendant and was attempting to continue to conceal her criminal acts.
Whether her statements had an appropriate purpose, block 691F. SUPP. at 699-700
Suite J, or were rather efforts by a criminal organization
to silence its victims, is obviously contested. Accordingly, Obvious issues
of fact exist as to whether or not defendant contemplated litigation.
Distorting reality, defendant further argues statements pertinent to a good
faith anticipated litigation made by attorneys or their agents under
their direction before the commencement of litigation are privileged. MSJ
at 33. The record evidence shows that defendant attorneys did
not make the defamatory statement. Further, defendant's attorney's agents did
not make the defamatory statement. the defendant did. And there
was no statement made by anyone before the commencement of
litigation because litigation never commenced. Accordingly, the case defendant, sites
where attorneys are making statements or where clients are making
statements to their attorneys regarding judicial proceedings, including malpractice, are
wholly in opposite as detailed below. Similarly, in Black v.
Green Harbor Homeowners Association, Inc., 19A. D. 3D, 962, 963, 798, N.Y.S.2D, 753, 754,
and 2005, cited by defendant, the court held a privilege
applied to a letter sent by a homeowner. The court
held a privilege applied to a letter sent by a
homeowners association board of directors to the association's members, informing
them of the status of litigation to which the association
was a party and to the association's letter to the
state attorney general sent to discharge its duties to the association.
In this case, litigation was actually pending. The communication was
sent by a party to that litigation as part of
its duties, and the communication itself concerned the litigation. The
defendant's press release fits none of those descriptions. Unsurprisingly, defendant
cites no case in which a court has held that
this or any qualified privilege extends to internationally disseminated press
releases defaming a non-party to the purported anticipated litigation. Regardless
of whether or not Barton had a hand in drafting
the statement, Another disputed issue of fact for the jury,
defendant issued the statement, instructed that it be published, and
the statement she issued was attributed to her and not
her attorney or his agents. Accordingly, all the case law
defendant cites about attorney making a statement or a client
making a statement to their attorney or a malpractice carrier
is in opposite. 2. Defendant is foreclosed from using the
pre-litigation privilege because she acted with malice. In any event,
because defendant acted with malice, she cannot avail herself of
the pre-litigation privilege. As this court has explained denying defendant's
motion to dismiss, there is no qualified privilege under New
York law when such statements are spoken with malice, knowledge
of their falsity, or reckless disregard for the truth. Roberts v. Maxwell, 165F, SUPP. 3D,
at 155, citing Block 691, F.SUPP.3D, at 699 Suite J,
SDNY 1988. There is ample record evidence that defendant acted
with malice in issuing the press release, thereby making the
litigation privilege inapplicable. See Block 691 F.S.U.P.P. at 700. Here,
sufficient evidence has been adduced to support the inference that
defendant acted with malice and may not therefore claim a
qualified privilege under New York law. A genuine issue as
to malice an appropriate purpose, has properly been raised and
is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. For example, Ms. Schuberg
testified that defendant recruited her for sex with Epstein, thus
corroborating Ms. Roberts' own account of defendant's involvement in abusing
her with Epstein. For another example, Jeffrey Epstein's pilot testified
that defendant flew with Ms. Roberts on at least 23 flights,
thus corroborating Ms. Roberts' claims against the defendant. C. McCauley's
Declaration at Exhibit 15, Roberts' deposition at 34, 3 through 10.
For another example, Tony Figueroa testified that defendant asked him
for assistance in recruiting girls for Epstein. More testimony that
corroborates Ms. Roberts' claims against the defendant. And again, just
to interject, this is why we went through that Virginia
Roberts' deposition. All of these court documents dovetail into each other,
and when you put them all together, you begin to
see the true scope of what Jeffrey Epstein was up to.
Defendant's statements that Ms. Roberts was lying and her claims
of sexual abuse, were obvious lies, were not pertinent to
a good faith-anticipated litigation, but instead they were made for
inappropriate purpose, i.e. to bully, harass, intimidate, and ultimately silence Ms. Roberts,
as the record of evidence shows. Defendant knew the statements
were false because defendant engaged in and facilitated the sexual
abuse of this minor child. Therefore, they were made for
the inappropriate purpose of bullying, harassment, and intimidation. See Front v.
Khalil 24NY. 3D. 713- 720- 2015. Simply put, defendant sexually trafficked Ms. Roberts and
then tried to silence Ms. Roberts to keep her crime secret.
Circumstances that prevent her from using privileges designed to shield
legitimate legal disputes from court interference. New York case law
fully confirms that pre-litigation qualified privileges do not apply to
this case. Historically, statements made in the course of litigation
were entitled to privilege from defamation claims so that those
discharging a public function may speak freely to zealously represent
their clients without fear of reprisal or financial hazard. Court
of Appeals case somewhat extended this privilege by holding that
statements made by attorneys prior to the commencement of the
litigation are protected by a qualified privilege if those statements
are pertinent to a good faith anticipation litigation, ID at 718.
Although it is well settled that statements made in the
court of litigation are entitled to absolute privilege, the court
has not directly addressed whether statements made by an attorney
on behalf of his or her client in connection with
prospective litigation, are privileged to advance the goals of encouraging
communication prior to the commencement of litigation. We hold that
statements made prior to the commencement of an anticipated litigation
are privileged and that the privilege is lost when a
defendant proves that statements were not pertinent to a good
faith anticipation litigation. The Court of Appeals' reason for allowing
this qualified privilege could not be more clear. When litigation
is anticipated, attorneys and parties should be free to communicate
in order to reduce or avoid the need to actually
commence litigation. Attorneys often send cease and desist letters to
avoid litigation. Applying privilege to such preliminary communication encourages potential
defendants to negotiate with potential plaintiffs in order to prevent
costly and time-consuming judicial intervention. Idea at 719 and 20.
Under this rationale, the Khalil Court found that an attorney
letters to the potential defendant were privileged because they were
sent in an attempt to avoid litigation by requesting, among
other things, that Khalil return the alleged stolen propriety information
and cease and desist in his use of that information. Here,
quite unlike Khalil, the defendant's statements were 1. Made by
a non-attorney defendant through Gao, 2. Concerning a non-party to
an alleged anticipated litigation, 3. Knowingly false statements, and 4.
contained in a press release directed at and disseminated to
the public at large. The defendant's statements cannot be considered
pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, such that the
qualified privilege should apply. Finally, though it strains credulity to
even entertain the prospect, if defendant could make even colorable
showings on these basic issues, it would remain an issue
of fact for the jury to determine whether or not
defendant's press release calling Ms. Roberts' sex abuse claims obvious
lies was any type of cease and desist statement or
a statement that acted to reduce or avoid or resolve
any anticipated litigation, summary judgment is obviously inappropriate here as well.
All right, folks, we're going to wrap up right there.
And in the next episode, we'll pick up where we
left off. All of the information that goes with this
episode can be found in the description box.