Virginia Roberts Responds To Maxwell's Summary Judgement Request (Part 7)
Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.
Virginia Giuffre’s response to Ghislaine Maxwell’s motion for summary judgment was a direct challenge to Maxwell’s attempt to dismiss the case without a trial. In her filing, Giuffre argued that Maxwell’s statements denying any wrongdoing were not only defamatory, but made with actual malice—because Maxwell knew they were false when she made them. Giuffre’s legal team submitted sworn testimony, supporting documentation, and detailed timelines to establish that Maxwell had played a central role in Epstein’s trafficking operation and that her denials were part of a broader effort to discredit and silence victims.
to contact me:
bobbycapucci@protonmail.com
source:
Giuffre-unseal.pdf (courthousenews.com)
Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
In this episode, we're going to continue talking about the
Virginia Roberts response to Ghislaine Maxwell's attempt to get a
summary judgment. Number three, defendant cannot invoke the pre-litigation privilege
because she has no claim for good faith litigation. Finally,
defendant cannot prevail in asserting this qualified privilege because in
order to invoke this privilege, she must have a meritorious
claim for good faith anticipated litigation. Khalil specifically states that
for the qualified privilege to apply, the statements must be
made pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation, and it
does not protect attorneys asserting wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in
law and fact, in violation of counsel's ethical obligations. Khalil
24 NY. 3D states, at 718-720. Defendant has neither emeritus claim
nor good faith anticipated litigation. Defendant cannot have emeritus claim
for good faith anticipation litigation against the press or Ms.
Roberts because Ms. Roberts' reports of her sexual abuse are true.
Defendant knows that they are true and defendant made a
knowingly false statement when she called Ms. Roberts a liar.
Under these circumstances, defendant has no claim to make in
good faith, relating to either Ms. Roberts' statements or their
coverage in the press, thereby making her defamatory statements wholly
outside the protection of this qualified privilege. At the very least,
the issue of whether defendant has claims against the press
on the grounds that she did not abuse Ms. Roberts
is a question of fact for the jury to decide. 5.
Defendant has not and cannot show that her defamatory statement
is substantially true. Defendant's next claims that her press release,
calling Ms. Roberts a liar about her past sex abuse,
was somehow substantially true. Here again, this is a highly
disputed claim. On its face, to determine whether it's substantially
true or not requires extensive fact-finding, such as whether defendant
recruited Ms. Roberts as a minor child for sex with defendants,
live-in boyfriend, and convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein. Accordingly, summary judgment
is not appropriate. See Mitre Sports International Limited vs. Home
Box Office Incorporated 22F. SUPP. 3D 240-255 SDNY 2014 Denying summary judgment
because it would require the court to decide disputed facts
to determine whether the statement at issue was substantially true.
De Silva vs. Time Incorporated 908F 184-187 SDNY 1995 denying
motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue
of material act as to whether defamatory photo and caption
were not true, stating, in the instant case of De
Silva's contention that she was a reformed prostitute at the
time of photography and publication provides a rational basis upon
which a fact finder could conclude that the photograph was
not substantially true. Additionally, defendant has remarkably not submitted any
evidence that she did not recruit Ms. Roberts for sex
with Epstein, nor has defendant offered any evidence that her
role in Epstein's household was not to recruit girls and
young women for Jeffrey Epstein. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate.
See Stern v. Cosby, 645F, 2D, 258, 277, SDNY, 2009.
because defendant had not submitted any evidence to show that
Statement 11 is substantially true, her motion for summary judgment
as to Statement 11 is denied. Further, much of the
purported evidence upon which defendant relies to allege the truth
of her defamatory statement is merely hearsay, including inadmissible hearsay
statements made by Alan Dershowitz, who defendant did not depose
in this case, and whom Ms. Roberts has not had
the opportunity to cross-examine. hearsay cannot establish the truth of
a defamatory statement as a matter of law at summary judgment.
Lopez v. Univision Communications, Inc., 45, F. 2. D, 348-359, SDNY, 1999.
Denying summary judgment and holding defendants' evidence as to what
they were told by representatives of NYU and Keene College
to the extent offered for the truth of the matters asserted,
is admissible hearsay and an insufficient basis upon which to
grant summary judgment of dismissal on the grounds that the
statements were substantially true. Finally, many of the facts upon
which defendant bases her argument that her defamatory statement was
true are wholly claims made against Ms. Roberts and the
defamatory statement. For example, defendant supports her contention that she
did not recruit Ms. Roberts for sex with Epstein based
on the fact that Ms. Roberts lived independently of her
parents before meeting Epstein and Maxwell. Of course, a child
outside the supervision of her parents makes it much more
likely she would be recruited by defendant into sex trafficking,
but that is for the jury to decide. The fact
does not go to whether or not the defendant's statement
calling Ms. Roberts a liar is true because Ms. Roberts
never made any claims relating to where she lived prior
to meeting defendant. Moreover, it is immaterial with whom she
was living. The fundamental and overarching fact remains that defendant
recruited Ms. Roberts for sex with Epstein when she was
a minor child. Defendant next proffers Ms. Roberts limited high
school enrollment and short-term jobs that she held as evidence
that she and Epstein did not abuse her. The logic
of this position is unclear. The fact that Miss Roberts
worked at Taco Bell for a few days hardly establishes
she was not abused by defendant and Epstein. Indeed, if anything,
it shows the vulnerability of Miss Roberts to enticements that
a billionaire and his wealthy and powerful girlfriend could offer.
In any event, what to make of such fact is
something for the jury to consider. They are irrelevant for
the same reason as above. Miss Roberts never made any
claims about her studies or her prior employment. Indeed, Neither Ms.
Roberts' statement about being recruited by defendant as a child
nor defendant's refutation even mentions Ms. Roberts' lack of schooling
or lack of a stable home as a child. Purported
facts that have nothing to do with Ms. Roberts' claims
of sexual abuse against the defendant and nothing to do
with the defendant calling Ms. Roberts a liar bore such claims.
And they do not establish the substantial truth of the
defendant's statement. Tellingly, defendant cites to no case in any
jurisdiction that even suggests otherwise. 6. Plaintiff does not need
to establish malice for her defamation claim, but in the
event the court rules otherwise, there is more than sufficient
record evidence for a reasonable jury to determine defendant acted
with actual malice. Defendant's next and again quite remarkable argument
is that Ms. Roberts somehow will be unable to establish
actual malice in this case. One would think that a
sex trafficker calling one of her victims a liar would
be a quintessential example of actual malice. Defendant's spurious case
citations and misplaced argument do not detract from this core fact.
Though defendant does not mention the legal standard for actual
malice until she is 48 pages into her 68-page brief,
the legal definition of actual malice as defined by the
United States Supreme Court and reiterated by the Second Circuit
should be the light by which all of defendant's purported
facts and argument should be viewed. Actual malice means that
a statement was published with knowledge and the statement was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. Biola v. Disson, 607F, APPX, 1820, Second Circuit, 2015,
quoting New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376, U.S., 254, 280,
84 Supreme Court, 11 L.ED.2D.686, 1964. Defendant argues that Ms.
Roberts is a limited purpose public figure. While Ms. Roberts
disputes that claim, the issue is entirely irrelevant here because Ms.
Roberts will prove at trial with overwhelming evidence that defendant
made her statement calling Ms. Roberts a liar with malice,
fully knowing as a sex trafficker that it was false.
Put another way, defendant knew that Ms. Roberts was telling
the truth when she described how defendant recruited her for
sex as an underage girl and then sexually trafficked her
with her then-boyfriend Jeffrey Epstein. The Second Circuit instructs that
on a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot try
issues of fact. It can only determine whether there are
issues to be tried. If, as to the issue on
which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in
the record from any source from which a reasonable inference
could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, summary
judgment is improper. Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corporation 43 F. 3D
2937 2nd Circuit 1994 As the moving party, defendants have
the burden of demonstrating an absence of clear and convincing
evidence substantiating plaintiff's claims. The Soul vs. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 139F. SUPP. 3D618640SDNY2015,
citing Chambers. Defendant fails to meet her burden. of demonstrating
an absence of clear and convincing evidence substantiating Ms. Roberts'
claims that defendant acted with actual malice Ms. Roberts will
easily be able to meet any trial burden of clear
and convincing evidence of actual malice Tellingly, defendant does not
even attempt to address the documentary evidence nor the testimonial
evidence showing she was a recruiter of girls for Epstein.
As shown above, far beyond showing that a reasonable inference
could be drawn in her favor, which is all that
is required at this point to defeat defendant's motion, Ms.
Roberts will easily be able to meet her trial burden
of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Of course,
a plaintiff need only show actual malice on the part
of a defendant if that plaintiff is a public figure
or a limited public figure, which Ms. Roberts is not
as explained infra. All right, we're going to wrap up
right there. And in the next episode, we're going to
pick up where we left off with part seven. The
court need not reach the issue at this time of
whether Ms. Roberts is a limited purpose public figure. All
of the information that goes with this episode can be
found in the description box.